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  Subject Area:  Philosophy 
Abstract 
Religious populism has strong and profound influence in Indonesia. It 
challenges the rational foundation of the democratic structure of the 
Indonesian Politics. This populist political movement utilizes religious 
language and symbols as their language of political articulation, negotiation, 
and contestation, which then occupies the real and virtual public sphere of 
the politics of Indonesia. Therefore, this use of religious language and 
symbols has placed democratic system in a serious risk. This critical study is 
intended to investigate the disadvantages of the use of religious language and 
symbols in the political arena in Indonesia. I will employ Paul Ricour’s 
thoughts in his writing, The Fragility of Political Language, as a lens of 
analysis for that phenomenon. Through that analysis I argue that the use of 
religious language and symbols in political discourse contradicts the 
provisional character of political language in democratic political settings.  I 
suggest, therefore, the reenactment of the constitutional and rational 
foundation of democratic structure of Politics in Indonesia is seriously 
required. 
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Introduction      
In the constitutional nation-state of the Republic of Indonesia, Populism is a form of political regression. 
Indonesia had committed to overcome the politics of “tribalism”, or of sectarian identity when the young 
generations, -Jong Java, Jong Ambon, Jong Celebes, to name several-, in 1928 declared their dream to build 
one nation on the basis national unity (nationalism). By that declaration, their imagination of the national 
community moved beyond sectarian margins (Anderson, 1991). This declaration for national unity is 
confirmed by the political decision of the nation-state after independence to build political system on the 
foundation of modern constitution and rule of laws. Constitution and national laws then became a rational 
foundation of the national state to build a political system and structure.  
However, in the last two decades, -around 75 years after independence, it become increasingly obvious 
that new religious populism is played as a political movement or strategy, designated to challenge the 
establishment, with its rational and constitutional legitimacy (Hardiman, 2017).  This contemporary form of 
religious populism, I argue, is a form of political regression, since this political movement utilizes forms of 
sectarian political sentiment as instrument for political contestation. This political movement, affiliated with 
particular religious community, utilizes Religious language and symbols to articulate their aspirations and 
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interests. It influenced and even dominated political discourses in the public sphere. It can be used for mass 
mobilization as well to force their message and interest to the establishment or other political groups.  
Moreover, in the era of the revolution of digital information and the development of social media, not 
only does the use of religious language and symbol challenge the effort to build a solid and rational public 
sphere, it also creates virtual public sphere which endangers traditional fundamental pillars of democracy. 
Virtual public sphere, I believe, delimits the rational process of political deliberation, and endangers rational 
character of public sphere, since in many cases it heavily manipulates the emotional or sentimental aspect of 
the people. Whereas the critical thinking has not been part of cultural tradition of the Indonesian people. The 
advent of the Covid-19 pandemic has intensified the use of the virtual-digital media in creating virtual public 
sphere. And to some extent, it could also disrupt the traditional mechanisms and procedures of the democratic 
system.  It is obvious, therefore, that the use of religious language and symbols in political discourse, 
complicated with the development of virtual public sphere, has caused the rational dimension of political realm 
marginalized.  
Given those conditions, I would critically investigate the use of religious language and symbols in the 
political discourse, which I deem endangering the rational aspect of public sphere. The emerging phenomenon 
of the virtual public sphere, which is intensified by the phenomena of Covid-19 pandemic, will also be 
considered in this study. I will utilize Paul Ricoeur’s thoughts on The Fragility of Political Language as the 
framework of this philosophical critical analysis (Ricoeur, 1987). Through this procedure I will exhibit that 
the rational (constitutional) foundation of the national state of Indonesia need to be rearticulated. It is only if 
this rational aspect of political system be strengthened, the aspiration to build a strong democratic system of 
politics will be possible. And this rational aspect of public sphere can be reinforced by means of the rational 
use of political language in the public discourse. In order to achieve that objective, I shall organize this article 
into following structure: first, I will clarify what Populism is. Second, I will illustrate the genesis of populism 
in Indonesia. In this section I will also exhibit the form of Religious Populism in Indonesia. Third, I will 
explore the impact of the Religious Populism, which utilized religious languages and symbols, for the future 
of the political public sphere in Indonesia. And fourth, I will propose several solutions to overcome the 
disadvantages and problem of Religious Populism. 
 
Literature Review 
Populism as Political Movement 
Populism is basically a contested concept. Some thinkers such as Cas Mudde, Cristobal Rovira 
Kaltwasser, Jan-Warner Müller, consider Populism as a political ideology, some others such as Ernesto Laclau, 
Chantal Mouffe, and Lawrence Goodwyn, as political doctrine, strategy, or movement (Mudde & Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2017; Muller, 2016). Without undermining other positions, in this paper I identify Populism as a 
political movement, since this political articulation appears through political movement, with programmatic 
strategy, regardless of their ideological orientation. This is more a movement of the peoples, I believe, since it 
does not have to have a strong, solid, and comprehensive system of thought, such Communism, Socialism, or 
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Liberalism. This political movement, however, usually is combined with other ideologies, existing in several 
countries, such as Socialism (Venezuela), Liberalism (European countries), Nationalism (North America) or 
even with particular religious groups (The USA and Indonesia). This populist movement can grow among 
labors, farmers, ethnic or racial group, or other groups that are economically, socially, and politically 
marginalized. 
Political populism carries with it several characteristics (Babić, 2019; Muller, 2016). First, Populism is 
a movement of peoples who claim themselves as “populum” or “common people”.  These peoples identify 
themselves as the only group of people that represents and articulates the voice of the common people.  They 
struggle and fight for the real people, for their rights and interests. Therefore, when this group of people gains 
power, they do not recognize opposition; for them no opposition is needed and legitimate. Second, populists 
differentiate themselves from the elites, to be critical to the elites and the establishment. They divide social 
reality into two different groups, namely the elites and the real peoples. They identify the elites, which do not 
fight for their aspiration and benefits, as a corrupt and immoral. For populists, the elites are groups of social 
and political class that possess economic, social, and political privileges they do not deserve. These elites, 
according to the populists, manipulate peoples’ voices for the sake of their own interests and agenda. Third, 
populists are anti-pluralism and democracy, since they believe that only their group carry the voice, interests, 
and rights of the real people. They believe that only their group is able to transform the existing corrupt system. 
Therefore, for them, political deliberation is not needed. Fourth, they deify the communal character of the real 
peoples and the communal nature of human existence. In so doing, they reduce individuals to become simply 
as a part of, or a component of the communal entity, which they name “populum”. The fundamental rights of 
the individuals are suppressed under the idea of “populum”, as if populum is a metaphysical category, without 
existential reference, which is highly plural and diverse in many aspects of human existence. 
Populism is a political movement of the peoples, which combines their populist movement with 
particular political orientations. In general, peoples then differentiate right-wing and left-wing populism. 
Right-wing populism is associated with populist movements that connect with nationalism, while left-wing 
populism is associated with socialist political orientation. In reality, given the political constellations, a 
populist movement can collaborate with many different group affiliations, such as labors, peasants, ethnic, or 
religious tradition groups.  Both right-wing populism and left-wing populism, however, criticize and object to 
the domination or control of liberal democracies. I am convinced that, to some extent, liberal democracy gives 
birth to political populism. In the sense that, in one hand, liberal democracy gives a room for freedom of civil 
association, which enables people to build their group association. On the other hand, the objective of liberal 
democracy, which is to create political structure and procedure that provide equal rights and opportunity among 
members of the society and create common good, cannot be achieved. Many examples show that liberal 
democracy cannot reduce the political and economic gap between the members of the society. This system of 
liberal democracy, combined with the trends of economic liberalism-capitalism and globalization, as many 
examples show, even put many groups of society marginalized. Such a kind of “dysfunctional” liberal 
democracy can be found in the political system in Indonesia. Since, although claiming to embracing 
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“Democracy of Pancasila”, as a matter-of-fact Indonesia inclines to practice liberal democracy, which is 
strongly influenced directed by the system of economic liberalism-capitalism and globalization. 
 
Discussion 
Populism in Indonesia 
I will not elaborate a historical origin and development of Populism in Indonesia. I would rather exhibit 
existential stance, which argues that populism arises when people find that they are marginalized. They cannot 
pursue their aspirations, ideals, and dreams. They find that the existing socio-economic-political system does 
not open the room for them to achieve fundamental needs for their life. This can be considered as the origin of 
the existence of populism in Indonesia. Theoretically speaking, Populist movement came into existence when 
some members of the given society feel marginalized. It started when they found that their dream and 
aspirations, could not find place to be realized. This signifies that the existing democratic system and procedure 
do not function well. 
There are several conditions that initiate the growth of Populism in Indonesia. The first condition is the 
communal character of Indonesian people, coming from almost all ethnic community, which then constructs 
the idea of Indonesian nationalism. Traditional communality of Indonesia emphasizes the communal value of 
the social entity, which considers communality as a very important value, which in some cases reduces 
individuals simply as members of the community. The awareness of the individual rights inclines to be 
submerged under the idea of communality. The second condition is the socio-economic-political gap, which 
has been broaden during the period of military authoritarian climate of the New Order (Orde Baru) regime, 
which is still perpetuated continuously by new regimes until today. Several different regimes have changed in 
Indonesia, however they unable to make social-political-economic transformation.  Back to the New Order 
regime. This gap creates a context for the growth of Populism, since such condition marginalizes some groups 
of people. The marginalized people would eventually strive to build a political power by articulating the power 
of the common people (populum) and criticizing the ruling power which, for them, betray their promise to 
fight for civil justice, equality, and prosperity.  
The third condition is the dysfunctionality of liberal democracy (or Democracy of Pancasila). The 
perpetuation of the social-economic-political gap shows that the existing political system, namely liberal 
democratic system, does not function well. What really happens is only the development of “procedural 
democracy.” Indonesia has already constructed democratic political structure, constituted regular general 
election process for legislators and executive leaders, and practiced familiar procedure of democratic system, 
but those democratic exercises remain only at the formalistic level. And this procedural democracy is unable 
to create a just, equal, and prosperous society, giving room for populist movements to grow, as people strive 
to find alternative political strategies to open access to the economic, social, and political domination.  
Finally, the fourth condition is the process of “mainstreaming” the conservative religious stance which 
has attracted many people, in need of identity and definitive principles in the face of uncertain system of values 
as an effect of globalization (Hadiz, 2019). This process of mainstreaming conservative religious beliefs goes 
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hand in hand with the need to build a basis of political group, which is affiliated with religious community. 
This process ends up in the emergence of religious populism in Indonesia. In order to attract the followers, the 
political (and religious) leaders of this religious populist movement utilize religious language and symbols as 
form of rhetoric and articulation. The use of political symbols and language that are derived from religious 
materials and practices is powerful, since it can influence emotions, attract militant-faithful followers rapidly, 
and functions as instruments for mass mobilization. This use of political language and symbols has already 
strongly influenced the political discourse of the political contestation in Indonesia. This means that political 
languages and symbols, articulated by religious populist groups, have affected the formation of public sphere 
of Indonesian politics. In the course of time, this religious populism also creates exclusive theological 
reflections that is suitable to support their movement. Religious populist groups offer legitimate theological 
foundations for their religious populist movements. Taking this condition seriously into consideration, we need 
then to reflect further the correlation of Religious Populism, which strongly utilize the religious language and 
symbols in their political rhetoric and articulation, with the formation of Public Sphere. 
 
Religious Populism and Public Sphere 
According to Jürgen Habermas the public sphere is an arena "made up of private people gathered 
together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state" (Habermas, 1989). The political public 
sphere is an arena of political contestation and negotiation. In this public arena political discourse takes place. 
Political programs and promises are also articulated in this public sphere. We can identify political affiliation 
of different groups through their political articulations. What peoples consider as the objective of political 
programs, which serves for the realization of common goods (Bonum Communae), are articulated, contested, 
criticized, and negotiated in this arena. What peoples agreed upon and committed as common goods are 
deliberated in this political arena. The new challenge of the public sphere came from the intensive utilization 
of digital technology and social media (as several examples: YouTube channel, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, 
Line, and Instagram) in the political discourse. This new trend facilitated the emergence of a new digital public 
sphere withs its consequences. The emotional aspect of human being become more vulnerable as a target of 
political propaganda and manipulation. This complicated problem of new public sphere is intensified by the 
Religious Populism, which utilize religious languages and symbols in digital political discourse. An important 
study related to the use of the digital technology and social media for political articulations and contestation 
in Indonesia, to mention an example, was conducted by Merlyna Lim, as she published under title Freedom to 
hate:social media, algorithmic enclaves, and the rise of tribal nationalism in Indonesia (Lim, 2017). At the 
time of Covid-19 pandemic, when the social distancing is strictly applied, the use of digital technology and 
social media in the political arena increases. Therefore, the fabrication of social community, due to the use of 
religious languages and symbols in the virtual public sphere, is magnified. Nowadays, the public sphere and 
virtual public sphere in Indonesia have been dominated by the use of religious language and symbols for the 
political rhetoric and discourse. The rational aspect of public sphere, therefore, is in serious danger. Public 
sphere becomes an arena of cruel political contestation, heavily colored by hate-speechs, which violently 
attacks and marginalize different political groups. In order to reflect ritically on the impact of the use of 
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religious language and symbols in political discourse, I will utilize Paul Ricoeur’s approach in his writting 
Fragility of Political Language. 
In my reading of Paul Ricoeur’s writing, The Fragility of Political Language, Ricoeur argues that the 
Fragility of Political Languge can be traced in three different leves. First, at the level of public discourse 
(Ricoeur, 1987). In a democratic system, public sphere is an essential element, or conditio sine qua non for the 
democratic system. Without the public sphere, democracy will simply become a meaningless rhetoric or 
jargon. Public sphere is an arena in which political discourse is exercised. Public sphere keeps democratic 
atmosphere alive. In this arena, political ideals and orientation are articulated by means of political language 
and symbols. It is in this public arena that political language and representation are being contested, criticized, 
challenged. In the democratic system, every political discourse is never intended to find a final truth and 
ultimate political concept or solid political ideals. Every political language and symbol are articulated not to 
find a comprehensive, absolute, or final consensus. It is rather intended to find provisional terms or political 
language and idealism that can be agreed as a tentative consensus, which then can be translated into a concrete 
political program and actions (Ricoeur, 1987). It is in this context that political language is fragile. Political 
debates, discussions, contestations, and deliberations are not intended to find absolute truth or terms, but it is 
intended to achieve the best possibility of political formulation, although it is limited and will be agreed, based 
on consensus. It is in this context of the fragility of political language that the use of religious language and 
symbols and the articulation of religious concept from any religious tradition in the political discourse could 
be problematic. It is problematic since the religious concepts and language tend to be claimed as an absolute 
and final truth, while the political language is not intended to create such definitive and final truths (Wijanarko, 
2000). 
Second, the fragility of political language becomes more obvious, Ricoeur argues, when it is reflected 
in the context of political ideal and the objective of good government, which is to facilitate “common good” 
or Bonum Communae (Ricoeur, 1987). At this level the central themes of political discourse are justice, 
freedom, equality, and prosperity. Since such themes carry with them emotional power, due to its character to 
unite peoples and motivate them to pursue their essential and fundamental needs, those terms are very prone 
to be manipulated and to became instrument of propaganda. This is to say, those political languages related to 
those themes, can be utilized as weapon for mass mobilization, rather than to be utilized to articulate valuable 
and rational political conceptions. In the political contestation those powerful terms, such as justice, freedom, 
equality, prosperity, can be manipulated to insert other values or system of beliefs, instead of being used to 
articulate the authentic meaning of those terms. It is in this point that the potency of the conflictual contestation 
come into being. As Ricoeur wrote, “Essentially, it signifies that the historical realization of a particular set 
of values cannot be attained without doing some injustice to another such set, that the tragic aspect of all 
human action is unavoidable, and that no one can serve every value at the same time” (Ricoeur, 1987). Since 
politicians can utilize those political terms, to advance various different interests, the need to determine priority 
upon the values that need to be carried out by those terms, and the degree of relativity of meanings and of the 
quality of those values, - due to the different historical, geographical, social, and cultural context, causes those 
values to become ambiguous and fragile. In the meantime, those political terms, and their ambiguous 
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interpretations should be accepted by many through consensus, to formulate public policies, that affect and 
regulate many people’s lives. Consequently, partial understandings and interpretations of those terms by 
particular religious groups in many cases potentially trigger serious conflicts. At this degree, we find a paradox 
of the use of religious language in political discourse, due to the provisional character of political language, in 
one hand, and the orthodox-conservative character of religious views which are verbalized through religious 
language and symbols, on the other hand (Wijanarko, 2000).  
Third, the fragility of political language can also be identified, Ricoeur wrote, when we reflect on the 
horizon of societal values (Ricoeur, 1987). It is in this horizon that the ideas of a good government can be 
accorded with the form of what considered as a good life. At this level Ricoeur exhibits that in reality political 
languages are not only ambiguous but also ambivalence. Political language is ambivalent since the values 
carried out are also ambivalent. This can be reflected from the fact that human beings can both love and hate 
the same things, for good and reasonable reasons. Human beings can receive and reject the same values. This 
ambivalent character continues no matter by what terms those values verbalized. In such perspective, when 
the ruling government decided to select a series of values to pursue, those values are formulated in certain 
political languages, and those values will be measured and criticized by peoples based on their different system 
of values (horizons).  In modern society this phenomenon takes its form in the crisis of legitimacy (Ricoeur, 
1987). This kind of crisis of legitimacy is not related to the disobedient attitude to the ruling government, nor 
crisis of identity of the citizens in the face of existing government. It is rather an uncertainty that the ideals 
that has been selected and committed are the values that are supposed to be selected and pursued. In relation 
to this thought, Ricouer identifies that modern soceity has been trapped into the modernism paradox, in which 
they cannot find “self-identity” (self-interpretation of modern existence) from what they decided and promoted 
as it is instituted in the legal system of democracy. Modern society has been trapped to love what they hate, 
without any alternative to turn their way around to build society and define their identity. For example, the 
modern society has determined “development” as their ideal, so that they place prosperity corresponding to 
justice, equality, and freedom which they already instituted in their constitution. At the same time, the modern 
society is also being disturbed by the doubt of whether “the development” they intended is value that needs to 
pursue as their ideal. Moreover, modern society, with many new inventions and innovations of technology, 
related to the artificial human needs, in its turn it affects human attitudes that never be satisfied and stop their 
effort to pursue their new needs. This condition strengthens their doubt of value of “development”. Eventually, 
the development they already selected as their ideal of humanization can be loved or be suspected or even be 
hated. Reflecting on Ricoeur’s analysis on this level, we could see that the use of religious languages and 
symbols in political rhetoric could make the ambiguous and ambivalent character of political language 
becoming more complicated. When religious language is applied in political discourse, what is being employed 
is not simply religious vocabularies, but articulations of systems of values, which need to be comprehended 
on the basis of horizon of values of its sitz im leben. It means that religious values, views, and terms which 
incline to be absolute-conservative-dogmatic, can burden the ideals to build society (Wijanarko, 2000). In the 
context of Indonesia, the issue become more complicated, owing to the plurality of religious traditions and 
multicultural condition.   
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Paul Ricoeur’s analysis of the fragility of political language enables us to see the disadvantages and 
challenges of the use of religious language and symbols in political discourse. It will contradict with the nature 
of public sphere in the constitutional democratic political setting. When we reflect more profoundly on this 
kind of political articulation, it will become more obvious that populist movement naturally is anti-pluralism. 
Since they do not believe in opposition, the democratic political deliberation in the public sphere will certainly 
not be needed. Therefore, religious populism, which emerges in the setting of liberal democratic system, will 
destroy system of democracy itself. Furthermore, in the recent Covid-19 pandemic, the use of digital 
technology and social media for political propaganda become increasingly massive, the use of political 
language and symbols could extinguish culture of democracy. In conclusion, religious populism with its 
religious rhetoric needs to be challenged. 
 
Conclusion 
Reenacting Rational Foundation of Democratic and Constitutional System. 
Indonesia has committed to build a nation state under foundation of the democratic constitutional state. 
This is the rational foundation of the political public sphere in this multicultural country. Political articulation, 
negotiation, and contestation among the members of this constitutional state, regardless of their cultural 
background or religious affiliation, must be oriented under the guidance of this constitutional foundation. 
Political narrative and populist political rhetoric, built on the basis of sectarian identity, would be unsuitable 
with the desire to develop democratic political structure and culture. Therefore, the need for constitutional 
(rational) reenactment is really indispensable, especially at time when the social, cultural, and political identity 
are challenged by a new system of values, political orientation, and economic system carried by globalization.  
The use of religious language and symbols in the political rhetoric has occupied not only existential 
public sphere but also virtual public sphere. At this level, emotional aspect of our human capacity could easily 
be manipulated for partial political purposes. During the Ccovid-19 pandemic, the penetration of digital 
communication means and social media intensify and may open more vulnerabilities as physical spaces for 
political debates shrink. Dependence on virtual public spheres raises questions on vulnerability to political 
predators or demagogues, who claim to fight for common peoples’ aspirations and rights. Given that risk, I 
would suggest that religious language and symbols should not be utilized as political rhetoric in the democratic 
public sphere, both existential and virtual. Despite initiating a contradiction with the provisional nature of 
political languages, as Ricoeur argues, the use of religious language and symbol does not suit also with the 
nature of democratic deliberation process. Democratic political education and digital media literacy, therefore, 
would be seriously required. Moreover, due to provisional character of political language, the use of the 
political languages which promote universal values related to common human aspirations and needs, is highly 
recommended.  
The absence of a strong civil society in democratic political system, among others, can be considered as 
a condition that promotes the growth of Religious Populism. In such a socio-political setting the individuals 
and human rights are not conceded. Instead, the individuals and their rights are reduced to communal 
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dimension of society, as a communal entity.  In the context of Indonesia, in which religious institutions are 
supposed to develop civil society, the civil society does not flourish, since the religious leaders and their 
institutions in many cases are co-opted to the ruling power. This condition that also hinders the development 
of democratic culture among the society. In order to build a strong democratic culture and system, and avoid 
the growth of religious populism, Indonesia needs to grow a strong rational, critical, and strong civil society.  
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